Russia
Russia is the largest country in the world and the most populous country in Europe, which was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, many processes in Russia are explained by the peculiarities of the transition to a capitalist economy and the formation of a post-socialist society. After the period of wild capitalism of the 1990s and the rule of President Boris Yeltsin, his successor Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, and in 2001, the ruling United Russia party was formed. The party still holds a majority in parliament, providing the president with a stable vertical of power up to this day. Russia combines elements of a democratic political system with authoritarian institutions and methods of governance.
Current Situation
IMPORTANT NOTE
Ukraine has, since February 24th, 2022, been under siege. Due to the conditions of war resulting from the Russian invasion, we cannot at this time provide accurately validated and verified data and information on the current situation in neither Ukraine nor Russia.
The Russian regime is, through warfare, crackdowns and legislation, suppressing all independent and free media in both countries. This affects reporting by local and foreign journalists. The general media coverage is contaminated with propaganda.
As a result of this, we ask visitors to this site to be patient as we are steadily trying to provide validated and verifiable information on the war, its background and the role of far-right actors among those fighting in this conflict.
Introduction
Russia is the largest country in the world and the most populous country in Europe, which was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, many processes in Russia are explained by the peculiarities of the transition to a capitalist economy and the formation of a post-socialist society. After the period of wild capitalism of the 1990s and the rule of President Boris Yeltsin, his successor Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, and in 2001, the ruling United Russia party was formed. The party still holds a majority in parliament, providing the president with a stable vertical of power up to this day. Russia combines elements of a democratic political system with authoritarian institutions and methods of governance.
The main problems for Russians are poverty and monstrous income inequality, the powerlessness of citizens and the omnipotence of the elite, the police state and legal nihilism, the ongoing deconstruction of the social state, and the privatisation of the economy. Russia leads the world in income inequality (500 super-rich wealthier than 99.8%) and is one of the top three in the suicide rate and unhappiness level. Human rights are not respected in Russia.
More than 160 nationalities live in the Russian Federation. Over 79% of the population is made up of ethnic Russians. The most acute problem of far-right nationalism is among ethnic Russians which is directed against migration flows from post-Soviet countries and regions of Russia with non-Russian populations, for example, from the North Caucasus republics. At the same time, the nature of migration in Russia differs significantly from migration to Europe, as the post-Soviet space has a unity of language and cultural codes.
Russia occupies most of Eurasia and shares a border with eighteen countries. Its special geopolitical position allows researchers to describe Russia as a peripheral empire. Under Putin, Russia pretends to be a leader in Eurasia, is friends with China and Central Asian countries, maintains relations with North Korea, and opposes NATO countries. Russia’s most tense situation is in relations with Ukraine.
Status of the far-right in the country
The 2000s in Russia were the heyday of the far-right, but after the events of 2014, there was a split in the movement. Part of the far-right, which can be conventionally called “imperialists”, supported the annexation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine. Radical neo-Nazis supported the national revolution in Ukraine and went there to fight against Putin’s regime. Former comrades-in-arms faced each other in the fields of Donbas on both sides of the front. The 2022 Ukraine invasion has only increased the split among Russian nationalists.
The police crackdown on the far-right finally destroyed the movement: major organisations were banned, and their leaders were arrested. Right-wing in Russia is now a pathetic remnant of their former power. Nevertheless, in the spring of 2023, anti-fascist organisations noticed a sharp increase in far-right violence. A new generation of young nationalists has emerged in the country against the backdrop of the war, attacking migrants, communists, anti-fascists, and LGBTQ+ members. They videotape their attacks and publish them in anonymous Telegram channels. Some nationalists loyal to the authorities have been incorporated into the state-controlled nationalist associations Russian Community and Northern Man. Full-fledged far-right combat units also went to war: the independent neo-Nazi group Rusich, the monarchist organisation Imperial Legion, which is in opposition to Putin, as well as two groups composed of far-right soccer hooligans: the PMC Española, which is sponsored by a man from the Rotenberg oligarchs’ entourage, and the Moscow reconnaissance unit of the 106th Airborne Division, which was assembled with money from the ultra-Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.
There are dwarf nationalist parties in Russia, but they are not represented in parliament in any way.
Status of antifascism in the country
The anti-fascist movement in Russia emerged in the mid-nineties as a response to far-right violence and police connivance. The first anti-fascist groups emerged in punk and skin subculture to protect musical concerts from neo-Nazi attacks. However, when the antifascists began to fight back, the neo-Nazis went from beatings to murders. By the end of the decade, terrorists from the BORN group committed a series of high-profile murders, including the murder of judge Eduard Chuvashov, leaders of anti-fascist movements Fyodor Filatov, Ilya Dzhaparidze and Ivan Khutorskoy, lawyer Stanislav Markelov, and journalist Anastasia Baburova. Journalists have noted the connection between BORN and the Kremlin. On 16 November 2009, the day after Khutorskoy’s murder, antifascists openly smashed up the reception room of Maxim Mischenko, deputy of the State Duma from “United Russia”, who had publicly cooperated with the members of BORN.
In 2010, anti-fascists took part in the campaign to protect the Khimki Forest, after which law enforcement agencies turned to repression. Many activists have been arrested and convicted on trumped-up charges. The most characteristic of the time was the trumped-up case of “Antifa-RASH,” which was concocted by operatives of Nizhny Novgorod’s Counter-Extremism (“Center E”) department.
After the events of 2014, the anti-fascist movement, as well as their opponents, dried up and is now practically silent. In 2020, anti-fascist Alexei “Socrates” Sutuga was killed in a fight. In 2021, only one major event involving an antifascist group was recorded: a brawl in northern Moscow after a far-right concert.
Most Russian antifascist resources are not updated now. One of the remaining projects is the Antifa.ru channel on Telegram.
Historic developments
During the 1990s, dozens of nationalist organisations emerged in Russia as a right-wing reaction to the collapse of the USSR. The most notable phenomenon among far-right radicals in Russia was the neo-Nazi skinheads, or boneheads – an imported British youth subculture of the 1970s, which began to decline in Western countries. Also in the nineties, Russian neopaganism – Russian Vedism or Rodnoverie – became fashionable among the far-right, which further caused a division between the traditional black-hundredists Orthodox organisations and the Hitlerists, who denied Christianity as a “Jewish faith.”
According to rough estimates, the number of boneheads in Russia in the noughties was 50,000 people. Dozens of far-right groups grew into large organisations with branches all over Russia and including thousands of boneheads: National Socialist Society (NSO), Slavic Union (SS), Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), Russian All-National Union (RONS), Russian People’s Movement (ROD), Northern Brotherhood, Eurasian Youth Union (ESM) and many others. All the organisations listed here were banned to this moment except ESM. Their main goal, as described in the main bonehead book of this time, “Skins: Russia Awakens” (2003), was to create a legal party and get involved in mainstream parliamentary politics. The main public action for the far-right in Russia was the annual “Russian March,” held on National Unity Day on November 4. After 2016, the action fell into decline, and in 2021, it did not take place at all.
At the grassroots level, the neo-Nazis during the Steel noughties started street terror campaigns against migrants from the North Caucasus and Central Asia, blacks, Roma, Jews, and gays – all of whom they considered “an alien element polluting the blood of the white race”. Boneheads are organised into informal groups to commit hate crimes – murders, arson, bombings, pogroms. The most famous among them were “Mad Crowd” and “Combat Terrorist Organisation” (BTO), “Savior” (SPAS), “Schultz-88”, “Lincoln-88”, “United Brigade-88”, NS/WP, Ryno-Skachevsky gang, NSO-North, “Militant organisation of Russian nationalists” (BORN). In total, members of these groups killed more than 100 people and carried out dozens of terrorist attacks. In the public field, their mouthpiece was the leader of the Russian boneheads, Maxim “Tesak” Martsinkevich, who promoted violence through snuff videos on the “Format 18” project website. Tesak’s involvement in real murders, including the notorious “Execution of a Tajik and a Dag”, will only become known 14 years later.
The far-right terror reached its peak by the end of the decade. Whereas in 2005, there were 152 murders committed by Nazis, in 2009, there were 548 cases, the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor’s Office calculated. On 11 December 2010, thousands of nationalists and soccer hooligans rioted on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow after the death of Spartak fan Yegor Sviridov, leaving dozens of people injured. The Manezhnaya Square events became a convenient pretext for tightening control over youth movements and defeating far-right organisations. After the 2014 events, the far-right movement was depleted. In 2020, Russian nationalist Konstantin Krylov passed away. In 2020, Maxim “Tesak” Martsinkevich committed suicide in prison, and in 2021, Yegor “Pogrom” Prosvirnin, the nationalists’ chief propagandist, jumped naked from a window in the centre of Moscow.
International relationships
The ruling party, United Russia, has established ties with far-right parties in Europe, such as the Freedom Party of Austria, the Alternative for Germany, and the French National Front of Marine Le Pen. The foreign policy of the Russian far-right takes place against this background. By the end of the decade, the contacts with far-right parties had been lost, so when the invasion of Ukraine began, the Kremlin’s former far-right friends turned their backs on it. Only the Alternative for Germany was in favour of the Kremlin.
Russian far-right activists played an important role in forming the Azov regiment and the events in Donbas. Some of them – like Sergei “Botsman” Korotkikh – joined the National Corps party, formed based on the Azov movement. One of the most influential Russian neo-Nazis is Denis “Whiterex” Kapustin, who fled to Ukraine. He is the most critical link between the neo-Nazis of the ex-USSR and the Western countries. He promotes National Socialism under his “White Rex” MMA and clothing brand. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Kapustin assembled a neo-Nazi unit, the Russian Volunteer Corps, to liberate Russia from Bolshevism.
Another important far-right group is the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) which has established ties with European neo-Nazis and provided military training for them. Its militant branch, the Imperial Legion, reportedly has sent fighters to Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. Two members of the Swedish neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement, Viktor Melin and Anton Thulin, underwent the Partizan military training course run by a RIM before carrying out a series of bomb attacks against refugee centres in Sweden in January 2017. According to media reports, in 2020, extremists who belonged to the youth wings of two German far-right political parties—the National Democratic Party (NPD) and The Third Path—attended Partizan, where they received training in weapons, explosives, and close combat.
In June 2015, the RIM reportedly worked with the Russian political party Rodina to convene the World National-Conservative Movement (WNCM).
Because Russia invaded Ukraine, most international contacts among the far-right have been disrupted. The most active contacts of the Russians remain in the pan-Slavic space.
Political landscape
Far-right parties are not represented in the Russian parliament, so the far-right doesn’t have its own deputies. The “United Russia” party was formed as a conservative, but its ideology has shifted over time toward centrism. “United Russia” publicly maintains the anti-Nazi rhetoric that it uses against Ukraine and Western countries.
The far-right movement achieved its greatest electoral success in the 2000s when the Rodina bloc was established in the Duma, and ROS leader Sergei Baburin entered parliament on ROS lists. However, the ideology of Rodina and ROS is often described as a “red-brown” or “red-con(servative),” with its left wing represented by economist presidential aide Sergey Glazyev. Orthodox businessman Konstantin Malofeev was supposed to create a new ultra-conservative party based on Rodina in 2019, but negotiations ended up going nowhere,
At the 2021 Duma elections, Rodina took only one seat, which belonged to its leader, Alexey Zhuravlev. One of the founders of Rodina was the leader of the Congress of Russian Communities, Dmitriy Rogozin, who now holds a high position in Russian politics and heads the State Space Corporation Roscosmos. The far-right candidates – head of “Society. Future” movement Roman Yuneman, head of the Moscow branch of the Russian All-People’s Union Mikhail Butrimov, and member of “Conservator” Valentina Bobrova – did not succeed in the 2021 elections.
Also, during the 2000s, different deputies were allegedly linked to neo-Nazis. NSO leader Dmitry Rumyantsev was an assistant to Albert Makashov, a Communist Party of Russia deputy in the Duma. Also, far-right activist Yevgeny Valyaev was an assistant to Duma LDPR deputy Nikolay Kuryanovich. Ilya Goryachev, the BORN ideologue sentenced to life imprisonment, was an assistant to Viktor Vodolatsky, a Duma deputy from the “United Russia”. As mentioned above, Maxim Mischenko, deputy of the State Duma from “United Russia”, had publicly cooperated with the members of BORN.
An article was published in the media that BORN was connected to the Kremlin-backed movement “Locals,” which consisted of former soccer hooligans – leader of the Lyubertsy branch Leonid Simunin, one of the regional leaders Sergey Nikulkin, president of CSKA Rugby Club Alexey Mitryushin, political consultant, member of the Moscow Public Chamber Pavel Karpov and also high-profile official in charge of youth policy, former member of the Federation Council Nikita Ivanov.
Media landscape
After the police campaign, the far-right are afraid to speak openly because the articles on extremism are widely applied to them. Most far-right resources have been banned or abandoned, and Nazis have migrated en masse to Telegram as a result of de-platforming.
The largest far-right resource in Telegram is Pozdnyakov’s “Male State“, which presumably works with Russian security forces. Also, against the backdrop of the war in Russia, dozens of anonymous Telegram channels have sprung up that specialise in publishing neo-Nazi snuff videos.
Mikhail Svetov, chairman of the “Сivil society” movement and one of the main propagators of right-wing libertarianism in Russia, leads a YouTube channel called “SVTV,” which is widely advertised in the far-right milieu. At the end of 2021, Yegor “Pogrom” Prosvirnin, the nationalists’ chief propagandist, jumped naked from a window in the centre of Moscow. His project Czar.tv status is unclear.
The official ultra-conservative media in Russia are the “Tsargrad” group and its associated online resources. “Tsargrad TV” was created according to the canons of the American conservative television channel Fox News. From the start, Tsargrad was positioned as a TV channel with “news presented from a Christian point of view”. “Tsargrad” began to spread anti-migrant hysteria and conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic. Other media accused of nationalist rhetoric is online “Readovka” and its editor-in-chief Alexei Kostylev and as well as the former liberal publication “Ridus”, whose editor-in-chief is a former member of the neo-Nazi music group Andrei “Most” Gulutin.
Ultra-conservative media oppose the Western countries, which they see as a “den of homosexuality” and “biblical Sodom”. At the same time, the far-right repeats conservative clichés from the West, talking about the Great Replacement, the “White Race Extinction”, and the Narrative which is aggressively implemented by leftists, the dominance of feminists who want to destroy the traditional Russian family with the money of “Gayrope”. Russian ultra-conservative media also widely promote “ethical crime” topics.
Financial landscape
The far-right is a convenient tool for political manipulation. Their main asset is violence. The ultra-right was used in their interests by various groups, starting with the best-known neo-Nazi organisation Russian National Unity (RNU) in the ’90s. It was turned into a powerful organisation that acted as a scarecrow during necessary moments such as October 1993. But when its leader, Alexander Barkashov, became independent, RNU was quickly marginalised by secret services. Sympathetic middle-ranking businessmen primarily financed RNU; members of the organisation did not shy away from racketeering and protection of petty traders.
During the investigation of the NSO-North case in 2011, in which members committed 30 murders, arms trafficking, explosions, arson, and an attempted terrorist attack at a hydroelectric power plant, it was widely known that police found more than 200 million rubles in the accounts of Maxim “Adolf” Bazylev, the chief ideologist of NSO-North. Bazylev and Sergei “Botsman” Korotkikh were involved in a financial scam involving cashing out hundreds of millions of rubles. As part of this scam, the NSO received an office and a gym for free, and the society’s activists received money on secret bank cards. The media repeatedly mentioned Maxim Gritsai, a businessman with whom Malyuta and Adolf did business. Some believe Gritsai was an intermediary between the NSO and the secret services.
It is believed that the “Russian March”, and largest nationalist Russian movement in the 2000’s DPNI, was funded by the construction business in general, particularly Mirax Group, Rogozin, and oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Konstantin Malofeev funded nationalists from the Novorossiya project who fought in Donbas as part of the deal with the state VTB bank. Malofeev was involved in a criminal case about fraud with a loan. By 2015, the debt to VTB had already reached $600 million, but the parties had signed a settlement agreement. According to Kommersant, VTB forgave 85% of this amount for helping Donbas. Malofeev was put under US sanctions for this.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, Konstantin Malofeev assembled his own “Moscow” squad of the 106th Airborne Division from far-right soccer hooligans and sponsored it. It is also known that a similar team of ultra-right-wing soccer hooligans from the PMC Espanola is sponsored by the head of the security service of Russian Railways, Viktor Shendrik, who, according to the media, acts out of the interests of the oligarch brothers Rotenberg. Who sponsors the Russian Imperial Movement and its combat wing Imperial Legion is still unknown.
The sources of funding for the ultra-right in Russia are internal since the Russian security services closely monitor such things.
Reports
Quarterly Reports
Quarterly reports give in-depth insights into the most pressing recent social and political developments in each country as they pertain to the local far-right networks and their international allies.
Introduction
In early September, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a powerful counter-offensive with the Balakleya-Izyum operation, after which Russian forces were forced to retreat. The UAF’s success exposed the Russians’ main shortcoming: the Russian army lacked personnel at the front.
In response to the threat of an all-out collapse of the front, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on 21 September a partial mobilisation to affect 300,000 men.
On 23 September, the authorities of the occupied territories announced so-called referendums on joining Russia. Quickly organised referendum were held on the new territories becoming part of Russia, where, according to official figures, an overwhelming majority (97-98%) voted in favour. Now any attempt by Ukraine to retake the land will be seen as an attack on Russian territory. Today Russian troops control the main part of the territory only in Luhansk and Kherson regions. In seven months Russian troops have failed to reach the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Region, although this was exactly what was envisaged at the beginning of the SAO in Ukraine. In Zaporizhzhya Region, Russia does not control not only the main part of the region’s territory, but also the regional centre.
On 30 September, Putin signed a decree on the accession of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions to Russia.
In mid-September it was reported that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had allegedly announced his country’s possible withdrawal from the CSTO. Previously, Armenia had sought military assistance amid escalating conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Immediately after this statement, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi travelled to Armenia.
During the night of 26 September, leaks were detected in the pipes of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. The Swedish National Seismic Network recorded explosions near the Danish island of Bornholm at 2:03am. The estimated yield of each was about 100 kg of TNT equivalent. On 29 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Nord Stream accident an act of international terrorism.
On 26 September, the FSB detained the Japanese consul in Vladivostok, M. Tatsunori. According to the special services, he was receiving secret information related to the impact of sanctions on the economy. The Russian authorities said that the Japanese diplomat was caught red-handed while receiving “restricted distribution” data from an informant.
Updates in the National Landscape
After President Putin announced a partial mobilisation on 21 September, tensions rose sharply. Several waves of protests took place across the country, accompanied by clashes with law enforcement agencies and severe detentions. Mass migration of men of conscription age has also started, which has also led to tensions at checkpoints unsuited to the workload. The situation was particularly difficult on the border with Georgia, where the North Ossetian authorities were forced to introduce a high state of alert.
Nearly 1 million people have left Russia since the mobilisation began, a source familiar with Kremlin estimates told Forbes. Another interlocutor in the presidential administration specified that we are talking about 600,000-700,000 Russians. At the beginning of September, i.e. before the mobilisation began, Rosstat reported that 419,000 people left Russia for other countries in the first half of 2022.
A notable phenomenon has been the growth of protest sentiments in the national republics, where people are particularly emotional and at times aggressive. In particular, clashes have started in Dagestan and have become a challenge for regional authorities and law enforcement agencies. Conflicts have increased in Yakutia, Buryatia and even in Chechnya, where it has become difficult to conceal the contradictions between the society and the authorities, which Ramzan Kadyrov carefully tried to camouflage or suppress.
A widespread trend has been the growth of social aggression and violence that is reflected in a growing number of episodes. Dissatisfaction with mobilization is expressed through the burning of military enlistment offices and administrative buildings as well as local incidents involving the use of firearms. Another shooting of schoolchildren, this time in Izhevsk, also drew a wide response. At the same time, independent human rights activities continue to be curtailed: for example, Russian human rights activists have negatively perceived the ongoing update of the lists of members of public monitoring commissions (PMCs) that protect the rights of convicts and those arrested: the lists do not include all known individuals who have been engaged in these issues in the past.
In addition, there is a growing public disillusionment with the army and its capabilities and resources, undermining the basis for patriotic consensus. Testimonies of conscripts about the lack of basic conditions for their accommodation, transportation and training, and about the blatantly poor organisation of the conscription are widespread. Also negative are the numerous reports of errors in the drafting of the lists of those to be drafted, when people who are clearly unfit for military service receive summonses.
Transnational Activities & Group Interactions
Russian nationalists have switched completely to war. Even symbolic rallies in September were practically non-existent.
Serbian nationalists from the Serbian Action and other far-right groups carried a giant Russian flag through Belgrade as part of a procession on the Day of the Decoration of the Head of John the Baptist. The Russian Imperial Movement and the Imperial Legion assured that this was done by “their Serbian friends”.
On 25 September, the Serbian Action published a collage of photos of a Ukrainian soldier from Azov and a Russian soldier from the Imperial Legion with the caption “choose between evil and orthodoxy”.
Transnational Developments on Discourse in Mainstream Media
Renowned far-right journalist Michael Colborne has published an interesting text on pro-Russian sympathies in the Balkans.
Western journalists have noticed discontent among the Russian far-right, who support the war and Vladimir Putin. After a successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in early September, the far-right began criticising Putin.
The British newspaper The Guardian published a text headlined ‘We have already lost’: far-right Russian bloggers slam military failures. It quotes far-right leader Igor Girkin (Strelkov), who started a war with Ukraine in 2014.
A text similar in content and meaning was published in the respected US magazine Foreign Policy under the title “Putin Has a New Opposition-and It’s Furious at Defeat in Ukraine”.
Transnational Social Media Activity & Propaganda/Narratives
A video was published which allegedly shows businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, close to Vladimir Putin, personally recruiting prisoners from a colony in the Mari El Republic for the war against Ukraine. The video appears to have been made on a mobile phone or video recorder, which FSIN officers are obliged to wear. Who made is not specified. There is also no direct evidence that the footage, which is not of high quality and contains montage, is of Prigozhin, although the appearance and voice of the person recruiting the prisoners is very similar to that of the businessman. In the video, a man who looks like Prigozhin, standing in front of a line of men in prison uniforms, appears to be a member of the private military company Wagner and talks about the conditions of being sent to war.
The press service of Concord, a company owned by Prigozhin, responded to journalist enquiry by describing a person on a video as “monstrously similar” to the businessman and noting that he also had a “very well-positioned speech”.
“Indeed, we can confirm that the man in the video bears a monstrous resemblance to Yevgeny Viktorovich. Judging by his rhetoric, he is somehow involved in implementing the objectives of the special operation, and he seems to be successful at it. In addition, you are quite right to point out, dear Dmitriy, that the man in the video has a very well-positioned speech, just like Yevgeny Viktorovich,” the press service said in a message.
This video has become extremely popular on Russian social media. Prigozhin’s credibility among the Russian far-right has skyrocketed.
Transnational Political and Financial Cooperation
In September, Russian far-right groups were raising money for the front. At the end of the month it was also revealed that the leaders of the far-right publishing house Black Hundred had themselves gone to the front.
Introduction
June marked the 100th day of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In more than three months Russia has failed to gain a foothold near Kyiv, but it has succeeded in occupying the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. By the end of June Russia was able to build on this success and seize Lysychansk and Severodonetsk. Since the start of the war against Ukraine, the Russian army has lost around 34,850 soldiers, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ General Staff has said.
Updates in the National Landscape
In the first hundred days of the war against Ukraine, Russia received $93 billion in revenue from fossil energy exports, according to a report by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). The revenues Russia receives mainly from the sale of crude oil (46 billion euros), almost half as much from pipeline gas exports (24 billion euros) and the rest from the sale of oil products (13 billion), liquefied natural gas (5.1 billion) and, finally, coal (4.8 billion). According to the study, the EU remains the largest buyer of Russian gas and oil, accounting for 61 per cent of Russia’s fossil fuel exports between February 24 and June 3, or €57 billion.
The super profits of the Russian budget do not affect the standard of living of ordinary citizens. Even according to official statistics: the richer the treasury and the higher the export revenues, the poorer the population. Russian export revenues have increased by 1.5 times, the budget surplus has grown almost six times, the number of poor people has increased by 1 million and the income continues to fall, at an accelerated rate. Data on trade and tax payments show that the speed of the fall in real income is measured in tens of per cent, according to Independent Newspaper.
Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin becoming the most unpopular leader in the world, according to a Pew Research study, his rating in Russia remains stable at 80%.
On 17 June Putin spoke at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, where he made some important statements about the war and the current world situation. According to him, the economy is now in a difficult state throughout. All the world’s problems – today’s price rises, inflation, problems with food and fuel, petrol, in the energy sector in general – are the result of systemic mistakes by the US administration and the EU bureaucracy, Putin believes. According to him, the Russian special operation has become a “lifeline” for the West to shift all the problems on Moscow.
Putin stressed that the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by Western countries because of Russia’s special operation to protect Donbas were insane and thoughtless. Their sole purpose is to swoop in and crush the Russian economy, but it has not succeeded. An economic blitzkrieg against Russia had no chance of success from the outset, Putin added.
According to him, the era of the unipolar world order is over. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), according to Putin, has finally lost its political sovereignty, “and its bureaucratic elites are dancing to someone else’s tune, accepting everything they are told from above, harming their own population and their own economy, their own business.” In his view, the current situation in Europe will lead to a surge in populism and radicalism.
Transnational Activities & Group Interactions
Far-right groups in Russia have not been particularly active, limiting themselves to symbolic actions. Those who supported the war in Ukraine switched to humanitarian aid for the population of Donbas, such as far-right politician Roman Yuneman and his Society. Future. According to the report, the organisation sent more than 13 million roubles (€215,000) in humanitarian aid in June. This is primarily food, medicine, clothing, footwear, hygiene products and children’s goods. Dmitri Bastrakov’s far-right book publisher Black Hundred launched a similar project, Tyl-22, which raised more than 13 million rubles (215,000 euros).
Opposition nationalist organisations did not take radical steps against the war and Putin, limiting themselves to the usual fratricidal war rhetoric. One of the leaders of the Nationalist Movement, Sofia Budnikova, wrote: “The ‘military operation’ in Ukraine will have the following outcome: the extinction of Russians in the Russian Federation will accelerate, Ukraine will never again be a second home for Russians, and the very idea of Russian nationalism will be left in ruins. Besides standard anti-war arguments, the active members of the DN regularly write that this war will have grave consequences for the nationalists in the Russian Federation because the invasion started exactly under the slogan of fighting the nationalists.
The Nationalist Movement held an online conference on 20 June on the “Preservation and development of European nationalism in an era of global conflict between international alliances”.
The Russo-Slavic Association and Renaissance (RUSOV) published several photos from Poland in its social media groups, accompanying them with captions: “Support for the Russian brothers from a Polish associate of the International RUSOV Movement. Poland, Jasinowka village, Podlaskie Voivodeship. Glory to the brave Polish sons fighting for the freedom of Poland from western occupation and for a fraternal alliance with Russia, Serbia and other Slavic countries! The Slavic Sun is rising!”
Also on June 11th in Warsaw companions of the International Movement “RUSOV” from the Polish organization “Zadruzni Krag” visited the Soviet warrior’s cemetery “in protest against the Russophobic policy of the Polish government and in solidarity with brotherly Russian people, where they lit candles and paid tribute to the Russian soldiers who died fighting for the liberation of Poland from fascism, and went to the grave of Polish hero Roman Dmowski, who was a supporter of Russian-Polish friendship, to honour his memory”.
At the end of June, the Russian Conservative movement published a video addressing the Serbian people on the bank holidays of St Vitus or Vidovdan.
Transnational Developments on Discourse in Mainstream Media
Several dozen Poles are fighting on Russia’s side in Ukraine as part of the neo-Nazi Rusich unit, the Polish publication OKO wrote, citing an interview with Arwid Pływaczewski, a former police officer and now a pro-Russian activist of the nationalist, paramilitary organisation Zadrużny Krąg – Slavic Division and Rusov Poland. This is the first evidence of Polish involvement in Rusich.
“The Rusich battalion has volunteers from various countries who want to fight for the interests of the Slavic region and also fight against Nazi and Bandera ideology,” Arvid Pliwaczewski said in an interview.
According to Plivaczewski, the unit has about a thousand mercenaries, paid by Russia, and a commander is a man nicknamed “Slavyan”. This is Jan “Great Slav” Petrovsky.
The conversation with him was recorded and published on Facebook on 5 June by Krzysztof Tołwiński, former Deputy Marshal of the Podlaskie Voivodeship from the Polish People’s Party, then an MP of the ruling Law and Justice party.
The tone of the interview was clearly pro-Russian – when Pliwaczewski spoke about Polish mercenaries fighting on the Russian side, Tołwiński called their actions “fighting on the right side”, stressed their courage and claimed that “Poles are not interested in war with Moscow”. Plivaczewski added: “Many Poles respect Russians, many Russians respect Poles, they want friendship, I think this is the direction to follow.”
Also the major Russian opposition media outlet Meduza published a text on the history of neo-Nazism in Europe for its newsletter Signal.
Russian right-wing media outlet Readovka published a story about soccer hooligans who created a unit ready to engage in a battle in Ukraine. Stanislav Orlov (call sign “Spaniard”), commander of the “Skull and Bones” militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Russian military humanitarian association Española, leads such a unit. In the fan community, he is known as a member of CSKA’s oldest fan group, the Red-Blue Warriors. Many Russian football fans (of which there are indeed many) are involved in the Russian special operations in the Donbas under his leadership.
Transnational Social Media Activity & Propaganda/Narratives
As the Sova analytical centre notes, by late spring and early summer, the topic of the war in Ukraine began to fade away on all far-right resources, and posts dedicated to the war began to be gradually replaced by traditional content, including anti-migrant content.
Also, far-right Russian channels have reacted very strongly to the law abolishing abortion rights in the US.
The most famous neo-Nazi unit Rusich which took part in the ongoing war created its official Telegram channel.
Introduction
Russia has been waging war against Ukraine for three months now. Casualties are classified, but according to Ukrainian officials, more than 30,000 Russian soldiers have already been killed. After the capture of Mariupol by Russian troops, there was no change on the front.
Updates in the National Landscape
Despite the fall in real income, which the Ministry of Economic Development estimated in May at 6.8% in 2022, Russians have rallied behind President Vladimir Putin, who in the public mind is perceived as the man who alone made the decision to wage war. According to polls by the government’s Public Opinion Foundation, Putin’s support rating was 80. Before the start of the war in February 2022, his rating was 64.
The protests, which were coordinated by the democratic Vesna movement, were successfully repressed. The movement’s website was blocked, and anti-war rallies in the centre of Russia’s major cities, which were held every weekend, were no longer held.
Against this background, radical neo-Nazis, who did not support the war in Ukraine, turned to terror tactics. They set fire to military recruitment centres and cars with Z stickers – which motorists put on as a sign of support for the Russian military operation.
One of the detainees in the case of the attempted assassination of Russian top propagandist Vladimir Solovyov was a convicted neo-Nazi 29-year-old Moscow dweller Timofey Mokiy. Allegedly, on April 25 he threw two Molotov cocktails into the Moscow police department building in the Kosino-Ukhtomsky district; on May 18 – threw two Molotov cocktails into the military registration and enlistment office in Shchelkovo (Moscow region) breaking windows in the building; two days before this – he set fire to a military registration and enlistment office in Pronsk (Ryazan settlement).
Transnational Activities & Group Interactions
Serbian nationalists from Serbian Action visited associates from the Imperial Legion. They came to St. Petersburg and filmed a video with the leader of the Legion Denis Gariyev, who talked about the history of the Russian Imperial Movement, the Legion, and its combat merits in Ukraine. Judging by the description, the Serbs visited St. Petersburg in February two weeks before the start of the war, but the video was not published until early May. The Legion’s page also states that they organized marches in support of Russians in Serbia after the war.
Seems like after this event the Imperial Legion went to war in Ukraine where Denis Gariyev was wounded during the battle and at least two of his fellows died. One of them is Gariev’s deputy Denis Nekrasov, nicknamed Dobryy.
Some nationalist organizations celebrated Victory Day. As early as May 6, members of the Russian All-People’s Union (ROS), together with representations of the Moldovan Transdnistrian Republic in Moscow, Omsk community and Slavic Academy laid flowers at the tomb of Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin wall: altogether about 50 people with imperial flags and ROS flags gathered there. Sergey Baburin, leader of ROS, addressed the crowd and proposed to remember also those “who are fighting the Nazis in Ukraine”.
Transnational Developments on Discourse in Mainstream Media
Spiegel published a confidential report by the Federal Intelligence Service of Germany, which claims that at least two groups with right-wing extremist sentiments, the Russian Imperial Legion, a paramilitary unit of the Russian Imperial Movement (RID), are involved in military actions in Ukraine on Russia’s side. In addition, the report refers to the group Rusich.
The report does not specify the number of fighters fighting in Ukraine. Both groups fought on the Russian side in Donbas in 2014 and 2015. Cooperation with these groups brings the Kremlin’s stated reason for the war – the so-called “denazification” of Ukraine – to the point of absurdity, Spiegel recounts the intelligence document.
Ukrainian journalists discovered among the military correspondents of the Russian news agency RIA Novosti an outspoken neo-Nazi Gleb Ervier, who covers military events in Ukraine.
According to News.ru, Gleb Ervier is a far-right tattoo artist from Tomsk. He moved to Moscow in 2016 and together with Andrei Dedov, nicknamed Ded, a member of the gang of Russia’s most famous neo-Nazi Maxim “Tesak” Marcinkiewicz, opened the Studio 18 tattoo parlour at the Flacon art factory. Dedov may be involved in a series of murders. It is likely that in this connection he is hiding in Ukraine, despite the fact that he was included in the list of the “Peacemaker” website. Ervier also became involved in the propaganda of far-right views through the Citadel project, which produced three documentaries under the general title “The European View”.
Gleb Ervier does not deny that he was a Nazi, but he changed his views after the 2014 Donbas war. Dedov stayed in Kyiv and nowadays opposes Russian aggressive actions.
Transnational Social Media Activity & Propaganda/Narratives
Far-right Russian telegram channels have split into two parts, reflecting the situation in society. The far-right, which supported Russia, switched to blatant racist propaganda and published memes humiliating Ukrainians. Such memes portray Ukrainians as backward, rural people, usually using the word “hohly” or “rahuli. The latter is a slang term used by urban Ukrainians to refer to villagers who have not assimilated urban customs and culture. Russian far-right activists also spread anti-Ukrainian memes in the form of pictures that depict Ukrainians as pigs, thereby dehumanizing them. Neo-Nazi channels also distribute pictures of the corpses of Ukrainian soldiers with mocking captions. For example, the channel of neo-Nazi mercenary Yevgeny “Topaz” Rasskazov, who fights for neo-nazi unit Rusich, spreads racist neo-Nazi propaganda that ridicules Ukrainians in an extremely harsh manner, deliberately provoking a backlash. He even presented toys which praise war and humiliate Ukrainians.
At the same time, Russian-language far-right channels that have supported Ukraine publish exactly the same content with different emphases. They usually focus on Putin’s personality and portray Russians as backward, savage, barbaric people (as opposed to the Europeanized Ukrainian people) from Asia who do not accept democratic values and blindly follow the orders of their superiors. The Russians are portrayed in memes as beggarly thugs and descendants of the Bolsheviks who came to plunder rich Ukraine. The word used as a racist nickname is “pigdogs” or schweinehund. This term was used by the Nazis during World War II to refer to Russians.
Transnational Political and Financial Cooperation
The far-right is raising money to buy military equipment for the neo-Nazi Rusich battalions, publishing wallet details to transfer money via ordinary credit cards or cryptocurrency on Telegram channels. Afterwards, they publish photo reports of the purchases, showing donors that their money was spent wisely.
Public alt-right politician Roman Yuneman and far-right journalist Gleb Ervier participate in a humanitarian fundraiser. They do not raise money to buy military equipment but concentrate on direct aid to the affected population in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands.
In general, far-right and nazi activity in Russia during April 2022 was medium. There were no public events but nazis started a violence wave in Hitler’s birthday to protest against war in Ukraine.
NS/WP assasination case
On April 25, the FSB reported the detention of a gang of neo-Nazis NS/WP (National Socialism/White Power), who were preparing to assassinate Russian top propagandist Vladimir Solovyov at the request of the Security Service of Ukraine. It was also reported that they were discussing the murder of other prominent propagandists: Dmitry Kiselyov, Olga Skabeeva, Margarita Simonyan and Tigran Keosayan. It is reported that during searches of the six suspects, they seized components for the manufacture of explosives, as well as a sawed-off hunting rifle, an RGD-5 grenade and drugs. In addition, fake passports of Ukrainian citizens with false personal data of the detainees, which were planned to use after the crime was committed, were seized. After the operation, the FSB made a statement in the NS/WP telegram channel that the detainees were members of the organization, but the connection with the security or special services of Ukraine was denied. Security Service of Ukraine denied ties with NS/WP.
Among the detainees was nationalist Andrei Pronskiy, known as Bloodman. He is described as the leader of the NS/WP group and the administrator of the “Oderint, Dum Metuant” Telegram channel, who wrote there under the nickname “Signature Undecipherable”. In 2013, he was sent to compulsory treatment after a court found him guilty of the xenophobic murder of an acquaintance. In December 2011, Pronskiy killed an acquaintance, an ethnic Jew, and then posted a video of mutilation of the body). In June 2021 Pronskiy was arrested after a fight between far-right and anti-fascists in Moscow, and put under house arrest on charges of hooliganism, which was extended until 28 April 2022.
The media claim that the FSB identified Pronskiy by the inscription on his sweatshirt “Oderint, Dum Metuant”, in which he attacked anti-fascists. He posted a photo of himself in the same sweatshirt in the channel of the same name.
Other members of the gang include Vladimir “Molodoy” Stepanov and Vladimir “Scout” Belyakov, who were convicted in 2012 of racist murder, attempted murder and hooliganism committed on the grounds of ethnic hatred, Vasily Strizhakov, previously prosecuted for drug distribution and attempted murder and sent for compulsory treatment, and Maxim Druzhinin.
Arsonist wave
On April 20, Adolf Hitler’s birthday, the Nazis began sending out messages to the media and anti-fascists about the burning of cars with the letter “Z,” the symbol of the “special military operation” that the Russian army is conducting in Ukraine. In the message, NS/WP claimed responsibility for the car burnings. At the same time, the published video on NS/WP channel clearly shows a police car on fire. On April 21, police reported that a Nazi was detained in the Moscow region on suspicion of committing arson. He showed Nazi tattoos on the video and also had Adolf Hitler books and Donetsk People’s Republic flags found in his possession during a search.
Since the beginning of hostilities, at least six Russian regions have set fire to military commissariats. It is not known whether the attacks were carried out by the far-right.
The first arson of a military registration and enlistment office that became known to the media occurred on February 28: a military registration and enlistment office in Lukhovitsy, Moscow region, caught fire. As Moskovsky Komsomolets wrote Kirill, a 21-year-old local resident, became a suspect in this case: on February 28, he smashed the windows of the building and threw Molotov cocktails into it. “In addition, the gates of the military commissariat were painted in the colours of the Ukrainian flag, and a provocative record was left about a special operation by the Russian Armed Forces,” the newspaper claimed. On March 8, the arsonist was detained.
On March 3, pro-government telegraph channels dedicated to the work of law enforcement agencies reported that in Voronezh, an unknown person broke a can of flammable liquid at the front door of the military enlistment office. When the fire started, the arsonist fled.
On March 11, a young man tried to set fire to a building of military registration and enlistment office in the city of Berezovsky in the Sverdlovsk region. The fire was set by a 24-year-old consultant of an electronics store. He set fire to the entrance of the building, and the flames were noticed by the traffic police. During detention, the arsonist “confessed that he wanted to disrupt the drafting campaign”.
On March 18, in the town of Shuya in the Ivanovo region, a man threw an incendiary mixture through the window of the local military registration and enlistment office. Also in the city there appeared “inscriptions expressing disapproval of the special operation in Ukraine. The arsonist was detained five hours later – he admitted that he drank three bottles of port wine.
On April 18, unknown persons threw Molotov cocktails at the military registration and enlistment office in Zubova Polyana settlement in Mordovia.
On May 4, unknown persons threw Molotov cocktails at the military registration and enlistment office in Nizhnevartovsk (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area).
“Listva” bookshop police raid
On April 5, the far-right bookstore Listva advertised a lecture by Andrei Dmitriev, coordinator of the “Other Russia” party, titled “Limonov and Ukraine: How Prophecies Come True”. As a result, police came to the “Listva” bookstore, detained three employees and several customers, and seized some of the books, including books by Nikolai Ulyanov, “The Origin of Ukrainian Separatism” and Eduard Limonov, “Kiev Kaput”. It should be noted that “Listva” supported a “special military operation” in Ukraine.
Legal cases
According to the Sova Center, in March 10 people were convicted for xenophobic statements. Three persons were convicted for public calls to extremist activity, two of them – for calls for attacks on law-enforcement officers published on social networks and one – for a leaflet with appeals to attack Jews. Three people were convicted in March under Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code (public justification of terrorism on the Internet) for approving the terrorist attacks in Moscow and Beslan and shootings at educational institutions in Kazan and Perm. Two people were convicted – under both articles combined – for calling for attacks on the Russian president, FSB officers, and Jews.
In general, far-right and nazi activity in Russia during March 2022 was relatively noticeable as they reacted to the war in Ukraine which has been going on for a month now.
Russian far-right is divided over the war in Ukraine
Pro-war
The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Rodina, Male State, Russian National Unity (RNE), Russian Slavic Union and Revival (RUSOV), Russian National Union (ROS), Right Russia, Tsargrad, People’s Council, and a number of individual figures – Igor Strelkov, Vladimir Kvachkov, Alexander Dugin, Nikolai Bondarik and Yegor Kholmogorov – expressed their full approval of Russian actions.
With some reservation, the special operation was supported by the Russian Imperial Movement (RID), which stated that “we must fight not ‘for the Russians,’ as the RID considers Russians and Ukrainians to be one people, but ‘for the restoration of the empire.
On March 24, the RID reported that the first deck of the RID Imperial Legion had moved into the area of operation. Several people from Eduard Limonov’s Other Russia also went to Donbas. The RNE stated that it was ready to send volunteers, but whether it sent anyone is unknown.
Antiwar
The “Conservative” movement is rather opposed to the special operation: they believe that it should have started in 2014, and now the time has passed. Many of those listed also expressed regret that a large-scale offensive was not undertaken in 2014, but this did not prompt them to refuse to support the current offensive.
“Society.Future” (OB) by Roman Yuneman stated that it considered the special operation a strategic mistake and called for a return to diplomatic methods of conflict resolution. At the same time, the OB stated that Ukraine “has been methodically killing the Russians of Donbas for eight years,” and therefore the organization is going to “support the ‘Russian army’ and society.” The OB is de facto engaged in humanitarian projects: collecting aid for refugees, organizing psychological assistance, and donating blood.
The Great Russia movement, the Russian National Union, the People’s Resistance Association (RONS), the Nationalists’ Movement, the Right Bloc, and the Memory Front are against the special operation.
Pozdnyakov war support
The far–right “Men’s Legion” telegram channel published a call to stage provocations at anti-war rallies on March 6. “Men’s Legion” is a channel of Vladislav Pozdnyakov’s “Male State”, which changed its name after the organization was declared an extremist community in Russia.
“Your task is to come to an anti-war rally with Russian flags, posters and Z sign…you can tear up the posters, interfere with their agitation in every way possible, you can even spit in their face as a traitor to the motherland. But I warn you not to engage in forceful conflict, not to beat anyone, not to pepper them”, – the Pozdnyakovites wrote.
Then Vladislav Pozdnyakov created a database on Telegram to publish personal data of antiwar activists but the administration banned it in one day.
CitizenGo has left Russia
The far-right petition platform CitizenGo decided to leave Russia as a result of European sanctions.
Antifascists detained in Kaluga
On March 14 seven people aged 18-20 were detained in Kaluga. Four of them are charged under Article 282.1 for lyrics from their music band “Antisocial distancing”
A TV report about the RNE action in support of the army was broadcasted in Rostov
Rostov TV showed a news report about one of the most odious Nazi organizations in Russia in the 90s “Russian national unity” (RNE), which chose a swastika as its emblem. The report said that “the action in support of the Russian Army in the special operation in Ukraine was carried out by the patriotic movement Russian National Unity”. The headquarters of the movement organized a mini photo exhibition dedicated to the long-standing war of the West against the Slavic peoples. The photos show the aggression of NATO countries: the events in Donbas in 2014 and the bombing of towns in Yugoslavia in ’99. The goal of the action is to express a negative attitude toward the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, which has been developing for years.
Listva attack
On March 20, the far-right bookstore “Listva” in St. Petersburg from the publishing house “Black Hundred”, which supported Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, was attacked. An attempt was made to set fire to the front door. “Listva” blamed “Nazis from WotanJugend and pacifists” for the incident. On March 13, unknown perpetrators smashed the store’s sign, and a month later, on April 5, police raided the store.
Alexey Venediktov antisemitic attack
On March 24 in Moscow, an unidentified man dressed as a delivery man planted a pig’s head in a curly wig under the door of the former editor-in-chief of “Echo Moskvy” radio station Alexey Venediktov and put a sticker with the Ukrainian trident and the inscription Judensau (“Jewish pig”) on the door.
PMC E.N.O.T. Corp conviction
In late March, a Moscow court sentenced to 13 years in prison 47-year-old Roman “Vodyanoy” Telenkevich, a veteran of combat operations in Donbas, who was considered by investigators to be one of the leaders of an organized criminal community that operated under the roof of the military and patriotic organization “United People’s Community Associations” (known as PMC “E.N.O.T.” or “Racoon”). The court found that the PMC “E.N.O.T.” under the leadership of Telenkevich, under the guise of “patriotic education” of children was engaged in outright criminality – protection rackets, bilking debts, intimidation, robbery, thefts. The Investigative Committee of Russia actually recognized the activities of ROO “ENOT” as criminal and opened a case in October 2019. Then criminal cases were opened under Articles 158 (“Theft”), 162 (“Robbery”), 209 (“Banditry”) and 210 (“Organization of a criminal association”) of the Criminal Code, and their defendants were detained one by one.
The history of the scandalous PMC is interesting in its own way. Its founder is considered to be the leader of the nationalist movement “Bright Russia” Igor Mangushev. During a period of escalating conflict in the Donbas, he and his associates thought about how to formalize the actions of the Donbas militia.
In the spring of 2014, reports began to appear that Mangushev and other representatives of “Bright Russia” had gone to the Donbas on a humanitarian mission together with the “People’s Council” movement’s branch near Moscow. It was headed by Roman Telenkevich, aka Vodyanoy – that was his call sign in those years.
PMC “E.N.O.T.” was seen in pictures with the Russian imperial flags and nazi flags.
FSB reports detention of 60 M.K.U. supporters
On March 30 the Center of Public Relations of FSB reported that 60 supporters of M.K.U. group were detained in 23 regions of Russia.
The detainees confiscated “smoothbore civilian hunting weapons and ammunition for them without permits, homemade firearms and cold steel weapons, means of communication… correspondence with Yegor Krasnov, with photo and video recordings … actions of direct action, instructions for their conduct and involvement of new participants …”.
Legal cases
According to the Sova Center 13 people were convicted in March for xenophobic statements. Five people were sentenced only under Art. 280 of the Criminal Code for publicly calling for attacks on law enforcement officers. Three people – under Art. 205.2 of the Criminal Code (public justification of terrorism on the Internet) for their approval of the terrorist attacks in Christchurch (New Zealand) or the actions of ISIS. Two people were convicted under both articles combined for publishing video clips calling for violence against FSB and police officers and for attacks “on the basis of nationality”. Two people were convicted under Article 280 of the Criminal Code, Article 312 (embezzlement) and Article 163 (extortion). Only one person was convicted under Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement of hatred) for statements “directed against natives of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” made twice during the year (previously he had been prosecuted under a similar article of the Administrative Code).
Altogether Sova counted at least 38 convictions for xenophobic statements in 26 regions of the country since the beginning of the year.
The federal list of extremist materials (FFEM) was updated twice: racist songs of groups “Smerch” and “SturmRise”, anti-religious cartoons, the anti-Semitic text of the author under a pseudonym of Chuma Balamut, the speech of the leader of the Third Reich Adolf Hitler, video-clip with appeals to violence against state figures of RF were added to the list.
The association Male State, recognized as extremist by the decision of Nizhniy Novgorod regional court as early as October 18, 2021, was added to the Federal list of extremist organizations in March under clause 90.
At least 12 people were fined under Article 20.3.1 of the Administrative Code (incitement of hatred), corresponding to Article 282 part 1 of the Criminal Code, for publishing materials aimed at inciting hatred against natives of Central Asia, the Caucasus, black people, Russians, homosexuals and police officers on social networks (mostly on Vkontakte, but also on Odnoklassniki and Instagram).
At least five people were fined under Article 20.29 of the Administrative Code (production and distribution of prohibited materials) for publishing materials from the FSEM on social networks.
At least 19 people were punished under Article 20.3 of the Administrative Code (propaganda and public display of Nazi symbols and symbols of prohibited organizations). Four people raised their hands in a Nazi salute in public places, one drew swastikas on the pavement, and two displayed their own tattoos. The rest posted Nazi symbols on social networks. Five people were sentenced to administrative arrests, and the rest were fined.
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine and started a war under the pretext of “denazification”. Preparations for the conflict in Ukraine became the main topic of discussion in February, including among the far-right, who, as usual, were sharply polarized. In general, far-right and nazi activity in Russia during February 2022 was small.
How the Russian far-right reacted to the war
The first war in east Ukraine in 2014 divided the Russian far-right into two opposite camps. While Russian nationalists of the imperial, Black Hundreds type sided with the Russian intervention, those from Nazi subcultures took the pro-Ukrainian side and viewed the Maidan as a success of related far-right groups. Much more questions were raised by the position of new far-right figures and formations that had no time to publicly take sides in the Ukrainian conflict.
Orthodox nationalist Egor Holmogorov, “Sputnik I Pogrom” and publishing house “Black hundred” unconditionally supported the war.
New right-wing politician Roman Yuneman tried to manoeuvre, welcoming the recognition of the independence of the DNR and LNR, but after the outbreak of hostilities changed his mind and condemned the war. Now his organization is collecting money for humanitarian aid for the inhabitants of Donbas.
A similar thing happened to Vladislav Pozdnyakov’s Male State, which is now the most prominent far-right community. Initially, he was in opposition to the authorities, so he was expected to condemn the war. However, after the outbreak of hostilities, Pozdniakov switched to a sharply patriotic tone. He swore at Ukrainian subscribers and urged his supporters to put the letter Z on their avatars – similar markings were found on Russian military equipment around Ukrainian borders – and urged Ukrainians to surrender. During anti-war rallies in major Russian cities, Pozdnyakov called for provocations at rallies, but in reality, MG supporters got by with patriotic posters. In addition, supporters of Pozdnyakov began to collect personal data of anti-war activists in a separate Telegram channel, but the messenger administration deleted it a day later. Pozdnyakov himself is most likely hiding in Montenegro.
The radical terrorist Nazi group NS/WP did not choose sides in the military conflict, limiting itself to noting that white people were killing white people. At the same time, they did not distance themselves from the conflict, but instead stepped up their agitation, calling for using the troubled times to commit murder.
The unorganized mass of non-partisan Nazis among the fans of Maxim “Tesak” Martsinkevich refused to support the war against Ukraine and moved on to active criticism of the Putin regime.
“Empire” by Konstantin Malofeev
A major Russian book publishing house AST has released the first volume of “Empire” by Konstantin Malofeyev, head of the Tsargrad group of companies and Orthodox businessman who came under U.S. sanctions for allegedly sponsoring separatists in Donbas in 2014. Researchers have read the book and concluded that Malofeev is reinventing anti-Semitism in his book, which was most likely written by a team of ghostwriters of varying degrees of qualification.
Nazi Dating Service
At the beginning of February, Russian-speaking Nazis launched a channel on Telegram for ultra-right-wing dating. The creators collect Nazi profiles through an anonymous bot and publish them in the channel with photos, short descriptions, and nicknames. The address of the channel is not listed, also for security reasons. Perhaps the photos are fake, and the channel was launched to collect private data.
Legal cases
In February 2022, according to the Sova Center, two people suffered xenophobically motivated violence.
In February only one conviction for xenophobically motivated violence was known. A court in St. Petersburg sentenced Yevgeny Ludanov to six months in a strict regime penal colony for attacking a homeless man.
We can also mention the sentence handed down to Nazi Andrei Smagin for attempting to blow up a dormitory for migrants in Tambov. He was sentenced to eight years in a strict regime penal colony.
In February 14 people were convicted for xenophobic statements. Four people were convicted under Article 280 of the Criminal Code (public calls to extremist activity), three were convicted for publishing on Vkontakte and Telegram the statements calling to attack Roma or law-enforcement officers, and the fourth shouted calls to attack police right from the window of his prison cell. Two people were convicted under both of the above-mentioned articles of the Criminal Code for calling on VKontakte to attack “certain ethnic groups. One person was convicted under part 1 of article 354.1 of the Criminal Code (rehabilitation of Nazism) for posts in the social networking site, in which he “publicly denied the facts established by the verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis. At least eight people were punished under Article 20.3.1 of the Administrative Code (inciting hatred). Seven of them were fined for publishing on social networks comments and videos inciting hatred against Ukrainians, natives of Central Asia, the Caucasus and other ethnic groups, as well as children. One person, Edem Dudakov, a delegate of the Qurultai of the Crimean Tatar people and former head of the State Committee for Nationalities and Deported Citizens of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, was arrested for publishing a post about “militant Watniks” on Facebook, in which experts found linguistic and psychological signs of “inciting hatred towards Russians”.
At least eight people were punished under Article 20.3 of the Administrative Code (propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi symbols and symbols of banned organizations). One of them was a colony inmate who displayed his own tattoos with swastikas, while the rest displayed Nazi symbols on social networks
Analysis
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