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Ukraine

National Corps Party

The **National Corps Party** (commonly shortened to Natscorpus in Russian and Ukrainian) is the political wing of the Azov Movement and currently its key component. The party’s leader is former Azov regiment commander **Andriy Biletsky**, and key positions in the party are held by former veterans of the regiment. The party has become the main nationalist force in Ukraine and a gravitational point for far-right activists of varying degrees of radicality, including outright neo-Nazis. The party has up to 10,000 members, centers in all regions of Ukraine, and an extensive infrastructure, including training bases, offices, hubs, and training grounds.

The party’s symbols (e.g. Wolfsangel) and the ideology of the organizations that founded the National Corps both refer to neo-Nazism. However, the party itself denies neo-Nazi connotations and explains that the symbol is a combination of the letters “N” and “I”, meaning “the idea of nation”.

The party was officially established on October 14, 2016, on the basis of the public organization **Azov Civil Corps** (CC Azov). CC Azov was created as an association of veterans of the Azov battalion, designed to involve fighters who have returned from the front, as well as far-right who were oriented towards Azov, in political activity. The organization declared its main goal as “fighting internal enemies”, while the battalion was fighting the external enemies. The organization’s political opponents, including leftists, were also considered internal enemies from the very beginning. On January 19, 2016, members of Azov Civil Corps disrupted the annual commemoration of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova, killed in Moscow by Russian neo-Nazis from BORN in 2009 (from Russian “Combat Organization of Russian Nationalists”).

In 2015, Nazary Kravchenko, a member of the far-right fan movement, headed the Kiev center of the Civil Corps. In 2016, he became the head of the organization’s central headquarters, and after the founding of the party became Andrei Biletsky’s first deputy. In 2019, there was a conflict within the organization. Nazariy Kravchenko and Sergey Filimonov (“Son of Perun”) left the National Corps, continuing their political activity under the name **Honor**. The conflict with former brethren escalated into a violent confrontation and continues into 2022.

The National Corps is traditionally associated with the political patronage of the ‘eternal’ Minister of Internal Affairs, **Arsen Avakov** (in office from 2014 to 2021). Ties between the Kharkiv organization **Patriot of Ukraine** (Azov battalion was created on its basis) and Avakov can be traced back to the 2000s. It was with Avakov’s assistance that Azov became part of the National Guard of Ukraine on special terms. And in 2014 Biletsky was to become a candidate for the **People’s Front party**, among whose leaders was Avakov. Biletsky was also a member of the party’s Military Council. Later, after human rights activists called on the leaders of the People’s Front not to include Biletsky in the pre-election list because of his far-right past, Biletsky allegedly decided to run as an independent candidate. As a result, he won in a single-mandate constituency in Kyiv’s Obolon district and became a people’s deputy.

The National Corps also has personal ties to Avakov. One of the key figures in the party, the Russian neo-Nazi **Sergei Korotkikh (‘Botsman’)**, has a friendly relationship with Avakov’s son Alexander. Photos show them spending time together in a restaurant.

National Corps was founded on the basis of far-right organizations (including the openly neo-Nazist Patriot of Ukraine), the fan and subcultural far-right movements. However, the party’s program today does not contain overtly neo-Nazi rhetoric, and its leaders regularly deny any ties to neo-Nazism, calling such statements Russian propaganda. Nevertheless, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, and other far-right ideas are the norm in the unofficial Telegram channels of members of the National Corps and its affiliated organizations. This strategy allows National Corps to be part of the mainstream political field and simultaneously retain the loyalty and motivation of its rank-and-file members. The fact that they have not departed from the original ideology is conveyed to movement members through recognizable symbols or rituals (organizational symbols, torchlight processions, mysteries, pagan symbols, honoring the medieval prince Svyatoslav, whom the far-right associate with the victory over the allegedly Judaic Khazar Khaganate). However, as journalist Michael Colborne, a researcher of Azov, argues, there is evidence of an internal conflict within the movement between the moderate top brass, who see themselves in big politics, and the more radical rank-and-file members.

The activities of the National Corps are primarily directed against political opponents. In most cases, they are members of the pro-Russian opposition, their supporters, and those whom the nationalists themselves attribute pro-Russian views. The ultra-right activity peaks occur precisely during the pre-election campaigns, be it parliamentary, presidential or local elections. In terms of the number of registered attacks or confrontations, Natscorpus is the absolute leader among all right-wing organizations in Ukraine. The victims of attacks are mostly not the opposition politicians themselves, but hired agitators handing out propaganda on the streets. Since 2020, the main opponents of the National Corps have been members of the paramilitary organization **Patriots for Life**, founded by **Ilya Kiva**, a former nationalist and current member of the pro-Russian party **Opposition Platform for Life** (OPFL). The members of this organization are mercenary athletes, not ideological supporters of the OPFL. They are poorly motivated, and during violent confrontations with nationalists almost always find themselves in the role of the victim.

Despite prioritizing the use of violence against political opponents, members of the National Corps have repeatedly participated in attacks against ethnic minorities, LGBT+ people, feminists, and left-wing activists.

The National Corps is also known for violence against its own members. In 2019, the group Honor broke away from the National Corps. The organization began to cooperate actively with right-wing liberal parties, becoming their power wing. Honor members also supported the former leader of the Right Sector in Odessa, Sergei Sternenko, against whom several charges were brought, including murder, as well as kidnapping and torture. However, Sternenko’s case is considered by many to be politically motivated, and key human rights organizations support him. The National Corps has taken the opposite position — this was the basis of the conflict. Members of Honor were invited to Azov regiment base, where they were beaten. From then on, the conflict between Honor and the National Corps escalated into a violent confrontation, where violence is used by both sides.

The incident with the death of one of Azov’s leaders Yaroslav Babich in 2015 is even more illustrative. He was found hanged in his own apartment. The official version of the investigation stated suicide. But Babich’s wife Larisa and one of the ideologists of the National Corps Oleg Odnonozhenko later said that Yaroslav was killed because of a conflict with Azov commander Andrei Biletsky. According to them, the executor of the murder was Sergei Korotkikh, and the investigation of the case was hushed up thanks to the presence of Azov in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In particular, thanks to a former member of Azov, Vadim Troyan, who at the time was the head of the police in the Kiev region (Troyan served as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs from 2017 to 2019).

Since its founding, the Azov Battalion, and later the National Corps, became widely known among the far-right around the world, becoming a symbol of Ukrainian far-right militarism. Given the severe restrictions on the activities of far-right groups in Western Europe and the United States, the absence of such deterrents in Ukraine and the neutral (and often benevolent) attitude of the authorities toward nationalists allowed Ukraine to serve as a hub for far-right activists from other countries. During the active phase of hostilities, they could directly participate in hostilities on the side of the government forces, and after the withdrawal of the volunteer battalions from the front, they could receive military training on the basis of the National Corps’ extensive infrastructure. Ukraine was visited by such well-known neo-Nazis as Brenton Tarrant (responsible for the mass shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand — he may not have actually been to Ukraine, although he stated so in his manifesto), Craig Lang (USA), Robert Rundo (USA), Michael Skilt (Sweden). National Corps also cooperates with the German far-right party **The Third Way (Der III. Weg)** and the Italian **Casapound**.

But most of the far-right moved to Ukraine from the Russian Federation. Some joined the Azov battalion at the beginning of the war in Donbass and actively participated in the fighting. Others moved later, when persecution of non-systemic ultra-rights began in Russia. Active propaganda of the National Corps and Russians who were already in Ukraine has also facilitated the move. Sergei Korotkikh, who was granted Ukrainian citizenship personally by the fifth president Petro Poroshenko, became the main propagandist of the National Corps. Korotkikh facilitated the relocation of many former associates from the Russian neo-Nazi movement, uniting them around himself. **Wotanjugend** leader and frontman of the popular Russian NSBM band **M8L8TH Alexei Levkin** and organizer of right-wing MMA tournaments **Denis Kapustin**, who is banned from entering the EU, both ended up in Ukraine. Almost all the far-right who moved here have cooperated or are cooperating with the National Corps. After the suppression of protests in Belarus, several Belarusian far-right activists moved to Ukraine as well, also rallying around Botsman.

**Olena Semenyaka** is in charge of working with the far-right in Western and Central Europe. She organizes joint meetings, conferences, and concerts. Her main goal is to reorient the European far-right movement to support Ukraine in the conflict with Russia. The **Intermarium Support Group**, also run by Olena Semenyaka, was created within the framework of the National Corps. It is promoting the idea of Intermarium — a geopolitical association of countries located between the Black, Baltic, and Adriatic seas. Such a union, unlike the EU, should be based on conservative values and cut Russia off from Western Europe. Conferences organized by the Intermarium Support Group are attended by conservative politicians from Poland, Croatia, Estonia, Belarus, and other Central and Eastern European countries.

The National Corps places great emphasis on youth work. Established on the basis of the National Corps, the public association Youth Corps annually receives grant funding from the state for projects dedicated to the “national-patriotic upbringing of youth”. There is also a children’s camp Azovets in Kiev. In the country’s regions, the National Corps is often one of the few organizations working with young people.

As of early 2022, National Corps remains the main far-right organization in Ukraine, although its capabilities have decreased. Its position was weakened by the resignation of Arsen Avakov in the summer of 2021 and the arrest of several of its prominent activists by the Security Service of Ukraine.